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196 نتائج ل "Sokol, D. Daniel"
صنف حسب:
Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics
The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.
Antitrust procedural fairness
\"Much of antitrust law scholarship has focused on substantive legal issues--theories of harm and changing law and policy. Surprisingly, there has been very little work that is comparative, on a fundamental element that is a critical building block to effective policy--procedural fairness. Procedural fairness encompasses issues of transparency and due process. Procedural fairness has been an important issue in global antitrust for some time. The types of due process concerns raised globally often relate to the lack of effective representation, the use of industrial policy by third parties, and procedural tools that do not allow for the most effective advocacy to lead to efficient outcomes. This book focuses on these issues and teases out common problems and distinct issues in particular jurisdictions. This allows for a rethink of creating a more effective system for procedural fairness, an exploration of these issues in each jurisdiction, along with highlights of particular cases in which due process issues have emerged\"--Dust jacket.
ANTITRUST'S \CURSE OF BIGNESS\ PROBLEM
Tim Wu is the most important academic popularizer of law and technology debates and is the intellectual leader of the neo-Brandeisian antitrust movement. He has brought antitrust from a technical subject of interest only to antitrust practitioners and academics to the forefront of policy discussions around the world. His ability to help shape policy is impressive. He is smart and a beautiful writer-an effective combination. Merely for making antitrust relevant to the general population, Wu deserves credit.
Competition Law and Development
The vast majority of the countries in the world are developing countries-there are only thirty-four OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries-and yet there is a serious dearth of attention to developing countries in the international and comparative law scholarship, which has been preoccupied with the United States and the European Union.Competition Law and Development investigates whether or not the competition law and policy transplanted from Europe and the United States can be successfully implemented in the developing world or whether the developing-world experience suggests a need for a different analytical framework. The political and economic environment of developing countries often differs significantly from that of developed countries in ways that may have serious implications for competition law enforcement. The need to devote greater attention to developing countries is also justified by the changing global economic reality in which developing countries-especially China, India, and Brazil-have emerged as economic powerhouses. Together with Russia, the so-called BRIC countries have accounted for thirty percent of global economic growth since the term was coined in 2001. In this sense, developing countries deserve more attention not because of any justifiable differences from developed countries in competition law enforcement, either in theoretical or practical terms, but because of their sheer economic heft. This book, the second in theGlobal Competition Law and Economics series, provides a number of viewpoints of what competition law and policy mean both in theory and practice in a development context.
The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement
Antitrust as a whole was transformed owing in large part to Robert Bork inThe Antitrust Paradox.This paper examines what Bork said and did not say about cartel enforcement and offers an examination of how the actual structure of cartel enforcement played out relative to what Bork advocated. To provide some perspective on Bork’s view of cartel enforcement, we compare his views with those of the other major influential antitrust book of the time by Richard Posner. We identify three distinct stages of cartel enforcement. Stage 1 is characterized by a low number of cartels prosecuted along with low fines and jail terms. Consistent with Bork’s vision, stage 2 demonstrates a significant increase in cartels prosecuted, although fines and jail terms remain low. Stage 3 (the current stage) exemplifies a decline in the number of cartels prosecuted relative to stage 2 but with dramatic increases in monetary fines and jail terms.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: PER SE ILLEGALITY, THE RULE OF REASON, AND PER SE LEGALITY
This essay describes Robert Bork's policy objectives for the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints, explains why Bork had such a disproportionate influence on the subject, and tracks Bork's influence on the development of vertical restraints in three specific areas: maximum resale price maintenance (RPM); vertical territorial restrictions; and Robinson-Patman Act violations. In practice, the shift in the antitrust rules applied to these areas has not been from per se illegality to the rule of reason, but has been a more dramatic shift from per se illegality to presumptive legality under the rule of reason.
Hospital mergers and economic efficiency
This article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Incv. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd (St. Luke's) decision -- proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that the authors hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the health care sector. First, the article addresses the question of how best to frame the acquisition of a physician group by a hospital. Second, the article examines the justification for integration as a way to address countervailing power in health care, the reduction of transaction costs, and potential cost and quality efficiencies. Third, the article applies the economics of these issues to merger case law generally and specifically to the St. Luke's decision.